Some thoughts on epistemic responsibility

From the Feminist Philosophers blog, written or at least posted by themistokleia, clearly in response to many of the thoughtless (yes, thoughtless) comments made here in support of the pseudonymous Jane Brownstein’s position: http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2014/02/criticisms-of-the-site-committee-report-on-colorado.html

Feminist Philosophers

[Trigger warning for discussion of assault]

Throughout my time as a philosopher, I’ve heard quite a bit of talk regarding ‘epistemic responsibility’ when it comes to discrimination, harassment, and assault. I’ve heard it much more frequently over the last few weeks, and so I feel compelled to say a few words about it. As it happens, I think I have a very different view of the nature of epistemic justification and the conditions under which agents can be said to have it than those who bring up epistemic responsibility in these sorts of conversations, but I want to address a slightly different question: What does moral responsibility require of us when allegations of discrimination, harassment, or assault are made? To be clear, what follows is not an endorsement of a presumption of guilt—rather, it’s an endorsement of action, sympathy, and compassion in the absence of certainty. It seems to me…

View original post 502 more words

One thought on “Some thoughts on epistemic responsibility

Comments are closed.